Alexander V. Prusin. The Lands Between: Conflict in the East European Borderlands, 1870–1992. (Zones of Violence.) New York: Oxford University Press. 2010, and, Timothy Snyder. Bloodlands: Europe between Hitler and Stalin. New York: Basic Books. 2010. by Gerlach, Christian
ALEXANDER V. PRUSIN. The Lands Between: Conflict in
the East European Borderlands, 1870–1992. (Zones of
Violence.) New York: Oxford University Press. 2010.
Pp. 324. $65.00.
TIMOTHY SNYDER. Bloodlands: Europe between Hitler
and Stalin. New York: Basic Books. 2010. Pp. xix, 524.
$29.95.
These books by Alexander V. Prusin and Timothy Sny-
der try to explain mass violence in parts of Eastern Eu-
rope in the twentieth century in different ways. Snyder
deals with territories that were ruled for some time by
both Nazi Germany and the USSR from 1930 to 1953.
He covers most of today’s Poland and Ukraine (the fo-
cus of his interest), Belarus, the three Baltic countries,
and the most western strip of Russia. Prusin examines
a smaller area (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, western Be-
larus, East Galicia, Volhynia, Bukovina, and Bessara-
bia—largely the western border areas of the former So-
viet Union) over a longer time span (1870–1992).
Both address, in relatively short texts, the murder and
death of millions of people. This poses great challenges
in terms of mastery of the material, of analysis, and of
the narrative. Almost by necessity, texts with such en-
compassing topics are prone to mistakes and simplifi-
cations. But both books provide knowledgeable over-
views of complex political processes on a high level of
scholarship.
Both authors are experienced Eastern Europeanists
who know the relevant languages, do not ignore East-
ern European scholarship, and venture into German
history and that of other relevant countries. Their
books are more or less based on published studies and
sources (in Snyder’s book, two percent of the footnotes
refer to archival material, in Prusin’s twelve percent).
Most of the facts are not new. So the value of each vol-
ume is dependent upon how incisive the analysis is and
what new, insightful connections the authors make.
Prusin and Snyder synthesize innovative tendencies
in recent scholarship by taking a multicausal approach
to explaining mass violence, tying the fate of multiple
victim groups together instead of concentrating on one,
and by examining a broader geographical zone, thereby
trying to move beyond national histories and their
somewhat more limited explanatory power.
Yet these two books offer very different narratives.
Snyder gives a rich account of political history. He in-
terweaves stories of individuals, showing them often
just when they were facing death, personalizing their
suffering. Using emphatic language in a moving, haunt-
ing account, he instills in the reader images of horror.
By contrast, Prusin, embedding his more analytical nar-
rative in a much broader prehistory, links a rather de-
personalized and sober social history with eruptions of
violence, but is stronger on the background than on de-
picting violence itself.
By and large, Snyder offers the more conventional
argument. His book lacks a clear research question. His
comparison of Nazi and Soviet violence has no clearly
stated purpose. Snyder voices skepticism about the
“overtheorized but misunderstood” European mass
killings (p. 383), but in underconceptualized studies un-
derlying assumptions may enter through the back door.
For example, Snyder rejects the concept of “genocide”
(pp. 412–413) but says “deliberate policies of mass mur-
der” are his topic (p. 410), which lets him largely set
aside what he sees as the “few million” unintended
deaths that resulted from forced labor or mass reset-
tlement (p. 324). His analysis, which concentrates a
great deal on planning, is as focused on intention and
the state as is the concept of genocide.
Snyder criticizes Hannah Arendt’s theory of totali-
tarianism (pp. 380–383, 485, n. 21) but lists as important
results of his study that Nazism and Stalinism were tyr-
annies, one-party states that made certain groups
scapegoats for their own failures, indoctrinated or mis-
led their followers, and relied on bureaucratic function-
aries who, either willingly or under pressure, chose to
act violently (pp. 388–399). These unsurprising results
resemble the outdated totalitarianism theory.
Snyder also claims to move beyond national histories
(pp. xviii-xix, 402–406), but his account in fact recon-
firms convenient Polish, Ukrainian, and Baltic main-
stream narratives of victimization. Snyder only deals
with “Soviet or Nazi killing policy” (p. x). “The blood-
lands were no political territory” but “simply where Eu-
rope’s most murderous regimes did their most murder-
ous work” (p. xviii). The problem is that, in Snyder’s
account, the violence seems not to have much to do with
the locals—including the victims.
Accordingly, Snyder tends to leave out indicators of
internal conflict that may have contributed to violence
and death; he does not examine them thoroughly and
does not tie them into his analysis. The author devotes
one line each to the Russian Civil War and to Polish
anti-Jewish policies and attitudes in the interwar years
(pp. 4, 283). He states that kulaks never existed as a
“social class” (p. 78); they were just the “best farmers”
(p. 33) and “natural leaders” (p. 29). Pogroms against
Jews in the recently Soviet-annexed territories attacked
by Germany in June and July 1941 had little to do with
local nationalism; for Snyder, who gives a low-end vic-
tim number, they resulted from anticommunism and
were “orchestrated” (p. 392) by the Germans, “a Nazi
edition of a Soviet text” (p. 196). The pogroms in
Bessarabia and Bukovina, reconquered by Romania
from the Soviets, do not fit this argument, so Snyder
only speaks of Romanian state violence. Denunciations
of Jews by non-Jewish Poles or Belarusians, helping the
German persecution of Jews, are downplayed. The civil
war between Ukrainian and Polish nationalists in 1943–
1944 that claimed tens of thousands of lives—an event
that Snyder has previously published on—is allotted no
more than half a page, in part declared a responsibility
of the Germans, and appears mainly significant as a pre-
text for Stalinist ethnic cleansing (p. 326).
The reader learns little about locals adopting and re-
shaping ideas that promoted violence. If Belarusians,
Ukrainians, and Poles killed each other, this is mainly
explained as an “accumulation of Nazi and Soviet rule”
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(p. 393). Snyder mentions that internal conflicts divided
cities, villages, and families, but there is no further anal-
ysis. “Only a small minority” even of local collaborators
are supposed to have “had political motives of any dis-
cernible sort”; they just obeyed, were indoctrinated, or
wanted to save their skin (pp. 397–399). From Argen-
tina to Vietnam, from Kenya to North Africa and Ice-
land—everywhere on the planet people were politi-
cized in World War II, just not in Eastern Europe?
Nearly everything is blamed on foreign intruders, and
communism is presented as an idea alien to Ukraine
and other areas under examination. According to Sny-
der, Soviet rule as such was foreign; there was only Nazi
“colonization” versus Stalinist “self-colonization” (p.
391). What remains in such a construct are the well-
known stories of the suffering or resistance of Poles,
Ukrainians, and Belarusians that are highly compatible
with official national historiographies.
Prusin delivers a more penetrating analysis that re-
gards the people in the region as actors. Where Snyder
blames imperialism and radical regimes, Prusin brings
in the role of young nation-states and their distrust and
persecution of minorities. He tries to link imperialist
policies to homegrown conflicts in the borderlands that
the former exacerbated. Prusin argues that nationalism
and various socioeconomic factors charged conflicts in
remote border areas and led to their expression in in-
creasingly ethnic terms, and that imperialist war twice
resulted in further politicization and multipolar out-
breaks of violence, including violence by non-state ac-
tors. In these eruptions, state persecutions of certain
groups and changes of rule almost fused each time with
civil war (chapters three and seven), especially toward
the end of each world war. Thus Prusin offers a con-
clusive phase model whereas Snyder’s sequence of
phases seems unsystematic (Snyder, pp. 415–417).
Prusin’s volume concentrates on precisely the inter-
nal conflicts that Snyder sets aside. In Prusin’s account,
however, the scope of destruction often remains un-
clear, and he frames conflict increasingly in ethnic
terms, although he tries to show how this was connected
to issues like class. Prusin’s analysis of imperialist aims
is patchy and at times contradictory (compare pp. 147
and 256). His social history seems clearer than his eco-
nomic analysis. For example, he mentions economic
disruption but provides few details and leaves issues of
starvation and forced labor aside.
Snyder correctly places much more emphasis on the
exploitation of the countryside and enforced hunger,
which claimed half of the fourteen million victims in the
“bloodlands.” Economically speaking, he emphasizes
the extraction of resources by imperialists as the cause
of mass starvation—but not the additional factors of
economic disruption, loss of livelihood, and lack of la-
bor, as the many famines during World War II, includ-
ing in the Soviet Union on both sides of the front, would
suggest. Snyder boils down Amartya Sen’s entitlement
theory to unequal distribution and direct violence (p.
42), paying little attention to the functioning of mar-
kets, social inequalities, and social conflict-also, for ex-
ample, among Ukrainian peasants. Another simplifica-
tion is that Snyder partially mixes up the German plan
of 1941 to immediately starve to death tens of millions
of Soviets with the Generalplan Ost for future German
settlements (pp. 160–170), although the latter had
other, conflicting objectives, concentrated on victims in
other areas, and was designed by other authorities at a
different time than the hunger plan. This is also an ex-
ample of Snyder portraying German policies as more
centralized than they may actually have been. His ac-
count focuses strongly on Adolf Hitler and Joseph Sta-
lin.
Snyder and Prusin provide us with complementary
accounts of violence in twentieth-century Eastern Eu-
rope, tying various victim groups together in multifac-
torial accounts. In this sense, their important studies
should stimulate further specialized research.
CHRISTIAN GERLACH
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The Society of Survivors of the Riga Ghetto in New
York commissioned Andrej Angrick and Peter Klein’s
excellent monograph on the history of the Riga ghetto.
It was published in German in 2006 and has now been
translated into English. The authors aim to write the
history of the people who were forced to live—and in
most cases die—in the Riga ghetto, but also the history
of the perpetrators and the evolution of their crimes.
They do this in great detail and with vast knowledge
about the genesis of the Holocaust. They do not con-
centrate only on Latvia, but they integrate what was
happening there into the history of the annihilation of
the European Jewry. This is the first exhaustive mono-
graph on the Riga ghetto, and it is a study of great im-
portance.
Persecution in Latvia was radical from the very be-
ginning. Angrick and Klein write that: “a month of Ger-
man occupation had brought destruction, destitution,
and primarily murder, with the mass executions in the
woods of Bikernieki following the pogroms. The syn-
agogues were destroyed, Jewish shops and assets con-
fiscated. A large part of the Jewish intelligentsia and
many able-bodied men had been murdered, community
life extinguished. Jewish Riga had already ceased to ex-
ist” (p. 82).
As in occupied Poland, German officials were sure
that the ghetto would be only a temporary solution, but
it existed longer than expected. German occupation au-
thorities started registration for forced labor (there was
great demand for workers in Riga) and ghettoization in
July 1941. In August the Jewish population was forced
to move to one of the most neglected areas of the city,
the Moscow suburb. The so-called large ghetto was
sealed off with barbed wire by October 25.
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